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Introduction
Econcxnic relations cf Comecon countries with the United States and
Western Europe are an integral part cf East-West relations in general.
It can be sai.d that United States policy exerts a significant influ-
ence on trade and econcxnic cooperation between Western and Eastern
countries* as much
*The term" Western countries" , refers to all OECD mertber-nations; the
term "Western European countries" to the European merrbers cf the OECD.
The terms "Eastern countries" or " Eastern European countries" - stand
f or the European rrerrbers cf the CMEA/Comecon without the Soviet Union.
Such a classification has also 1::een adopted in the statistical annex.
as Soviet policy has a visible impact 00 the economic relations of
Canecon countries with the West. The recurring interest in the devel-
opnent and future trends cf East-West economic relations reflects !TOre
the p;:>litical than the econcxnic significance cf those relations. It is
canrnonly known that the econcxnic relations re'tween East and West, and
especially these l:etween the United States and the Comecon countries,
are overburdened by so-called "political factors". There is still rruch
controversy concernil19' both the causes and final effects cf the "over-
politicization" of East-West economic relations. Q1 the basis cf pure
econcxnic knowledge and available statistical data it is very hard to
prove the existence cf some kind cf "cause-effect relationship" be-
tween political factors (or political forces) aoo the developnent of
East-West trade. Q1 the other hand it is known that there is "seme
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relation" between the shifts in foreign and dornestie ~licies cf roth
Eastern and Western countries and the developnent cf trade cnd econom-
ie cooperation between East and West.
I t ean l:e noted that many experts dealing with these problems eon-
sider trade as a J:araneter refleeting "the ups and downs" of East-West
politieal relations. Others assume that trade and economie cooperation
are the more "aetive cgents" stimulating the developnent of better
politieal relations l:etween the two different groups cf countries. It
is equally diffieult to settle the causal relations l:etween the so-
ealled diplomatie relations of the two superpowers (the United States
arrl the USSR) and the developnent of East-West economie relations as
well as to measure the inpaet (influenee) of other politieal faetors
on "all"-European economie cooPeration. 1
East-West economie relations cannot be considered as "normal" rela-
tions between two groups cf countries belongin;} to the sane socio-
poli tieal system, rather as sPeCifie relations of politieal adversa-
ries and potential enemies. This implies a different approach of the
Western eountries to the question cf developnent of trade with the
East as CX)ffipared to the developnent of trade and eeonomie relations
within the OECD area or with the developing nations. There have l:een
rather unfavorable condi tions for the exPansion cf nutually advanta-
geous East-West tra:ie which can be deseribed as an instrument of
securing and maintaining the so-ealled "politieal and military bal-
ance" between the two groups of countries •
In the post-war period, East-West economie relations ~re charae-
terized by four periods of more or less "stable" developnent: 1) the
11 freezing" of economie relations until the mid-1 950 I s (eeonomie war-
f are) ; 2) the linkage approach (until 1975) of irrlividual Western
eountries on the one hand, more "westward oriented" foreign trade
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policies of various CMEA countries on the other hand; 3} the so-called
policy of detente fran 1975 to 1979/80, a FOlicy \lhich in fact was
only another more "sophisticated" form of traditional containment-
policy; and 4} since the l:eginning oE the 1980 's the p:-esent ''era of
uncertainty" in which lx>th the Western and Eastern countries have reen
conducting highly arbivalent policies towards each other.
Aversion to the developnent cf trade and economic oooperation with
the East is especially visible in the United States which has never
been deeply involved in trade with Eastern Europe. It also must be
stressed that there are no uniform "Western views" concerning the
developnent of trade and economic oooperation with the East rot dif-
ferent interests and goals among the individual \'estern oountries. The
American view of economic relations with the East has remained rather
unchanged since the middle of the seventies and can be characterized
by "as much security as possible, as much continuity in economic
cooperation as unavoidable." In oontrast, the Western European view
can be described by lias much continuity as FOssible, as much security
as necessary.1I2
In the eighties the United States has reen exerting the most visi-
ble pressure on i ts Western European allies in order to impede the
further developnent of trade with the East. The greatest "quarreI
within the fanily", Le. between the United States and Western Europe,
concerning the pipeline issue has finally been settled, but the West
European countries bad to agree to increase the control of technology
exports to the East and to U[X1ate the Ccx:oM-list as weIl as to raise
the interest rate for credits granted to the CMEA countries. In reali-
ty, however, the Western European countries have not changed their
approach to econanic relations with CMEA countries. They are still
"naturally doomed" to both FOlitical and econanic cooperation with the
United States, especially in the area cf security , but on the other
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hand they are also still willing to expand their economic relations
wi th the CMEA countries .
It should be emphasized that Western Europe has crlopted a more
pragrnatic approach to trade and economic cooperation wi.th the East and
does not try to instrumentalize trade in order to gain political
concessions from the CMEA countries • Unfortunately, this is not the
case of the present trade (and foreign) policies of the Reagan Admin-
istration. The United States has openly crlmi tted that economic rela-
tions can be used as· an instrument for exerting influence on the
internal as well as the external behavior of the CMEA countries. In an
official report published in 1982 such an attitude was expressed in
the following wcrj: "Dur econanic relations with the East rray affer 1.15
a limi ted opportuni ty to influence Soviet and East EuroPean economic
arrl poli tical tehavior. In Eastern Europe our economic and trade ties
make up a key canponent of our overall relationship and a:mtribute to
our goal of encouraging evolutionary change, the increased assertion
of national self-interest and greater governmental respect for the
rights of individual citizens. • .• Improved trade (with the socialist
countries) must depend on economic reform,
Europe, and political-military restraint,
Union. ,,3
particularly in Eastern
particularly in the Soviet
In recent years there have teen numerous attempts to use trcrle
relations in order to gain various tx:>litical concessions. However, the
United States and the West as a whole have not succeeded in influenc-
ing the domestic or foreign policies of CMEA countries ~ economic
sanctions or credit and technology restrictions. SUch a policy has
only increased the distrust cf the 50cialist countries regardirg the
present fonns, goals and "rules cf the game" of economic relations
with the West.
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The present state of Arnerican-European economic relations with the
Canecon countries and the Soviet Union is the result of economic
factors (includiI'XJ the situation of the world econo~) and, even more
so, of political factors. In the first part cf this paper I will
discuss the main economic factors of recent East-West trade and. finan-
cial relations as well as U.5. and Western H.1 ropean trade (and. for-
eign) policies towards the Comecon countries in the 1980 I s. In the
second part I will analyze the commodity trade developnents between
Western and Comecon countries. In the third part I will examine the
future trends of economic relations between the Comecon countries and
the West. In ~ concludiI'XJ rernarks I would like to discuss the fol-
lowing questions: what are the further possibilities of increasing the
trade and economic cooperation between East and West'? From what side
and area can we expect the decisive impulses which will lead to fur-
ther expansion of East-West econanic relations? TakiI'XJ into account
the growing involvement of the United States in trade and economic
cooperation with the Pacific region rather than with Europe can we
assume that there is a proper climate for improving and expanding
economic relations between Eastern and Western Europe, Le. between
CMEA and EEC merrber countries which - in turn - could lead to the
"Europeanization of Europe"? And finally, what kind of forces, econom-
ic or political, will determine East-West economic relations in the
near future?
A detailed analysis of the political factors of East-West economic
relations lies ootside the raIXJe of this paper. On the other band i t
is hard to avoid political considerations in the context of trade
policy analysis. It has been said that "trade policy is foreign poli-
cy" 4 and this is most clearly true in the case of East-West economic
relations.
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1 •1. Some economic factors
If we assume that East-West trcde is based mainly (Xl the canpara-
tive cdvantage principle, this trcde can be considered as an instru-
ment of increasing mutual benefits and cdvantages for both sides.
Especially the European (both Comecon and Western) countries are
highly tracie-dependent econanies and therefore are interested in ex-
panding East-West econanic relations, mainly in the areas cf trade and
industrial cooperation. On the other band the United States is a less
trade-dependent economy and its interest in econanic relaticns with
the Comecon countries (especially with the Soviet Union) consists
almest exclusively of promoting the export of agricultural products.
There is a specific "economic interdependence" between the Western
European and. Comecon countries • The former are the main suppliers to
the East of industrial goods and are the importers cf (Eastern) raw-
materials, especially cf energy. 'Ihe Cbmecon a:>untries are dependent
on imports from the West of modern teehnology, capital and many in-
vestment goods; the Soviet Union is the main supplier to Western
Europe of gas and other raw materials. The European Comecon countries
are, in canparison to the Soviet Union, far less well endowed with
natural resources. They are, however, close to the large Western
European market with which they have long-standin:;} ties. Tak~ into
acc umt the existing cornplementary economic structures between Western
and Eastern Europe there seem to l::e g::xx1 conditions for the develop-
ment of mutually cdvantageous two-way trade in manufactured products
as weIl: based on ample supplies cf a nedium-skilled labor force
receiving relatively low wagesin Eastern Europe, and a higher-skilled
lal:x:>r force involved in more capital-intensive production at higher
real weges in Western Europe. 5
In the first half of the 1970· s there was, indeed, a rapid develop-
ment of East-West trade (mainly l::etween the European a:>untries) along
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these lines. The Comecon countries increased greatly their exports to
the West of light consumer goods aOO simple machinery as well as
spare-parts and canponents of these products, while at the same time
they increased their imports cf ll'Odern equipnent, technology and
consumer goods. *
* A detailed analysis of the commodity structure and developnent
trends of East-West trade is presented in section 11.
--------------------------~------------------------------------------
However, in the secoIXi half of the seventies it became apparent
that for the Comecon countries a highly disadvantageous canmodity
structure cf trade with the West bad produced a huge (Le. about $ 25
billion) deficit in their balance cf trade. In 1971-75 the imports cf
the Comecon countries fran the West were 25 per cent higher than their
exports to that area. At that time, (and throughout the secoIXi half cf
the 70' s), the Comecon countries were trying to adjust their produc-
tion structure to the changing danand in Western countries and to
consolidate their trade wi th the West. These efforts, however, did not
bring about the creation of strong export sectors in the Comecon
countries and did not improve the commodity structure of their trade
with the West. Since the middle of the seventies the individual Come-
con countries have l::een cw:bing drastically their imports from the
West in order to reduce, in this way, their trade ill'balances.
The briefly sketched conception cf "canplementary production struc-
ures" turned out to l::e a highly unstable l::asis for the developnent of
East-West trade in the contemporary world where a growing l1UIIber of
countries (especially the "Newly Industrializing Countries - NICs) are
trying to increase their share in the world market cf manufactures and
to accelerate their econanic developnent. 'Ihe Comecon countries have
traditionally had - despite the implementation cf economic reforms
far greater difficulties in adjusting their exports to the changing
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demand· on Western rnarkets than the NICs. The Comecon countries have
even lost their competitive p.:>sition in Western markets in those areas
where they once hcrl comparative crlvantage as over the NICs. This can
be illustrated by the following data concerning the general share of
both country-groups of OECD imports of rranufactures: 20 years a:Jo the
shares of the NICs and the Comecon countries (including the Soviet
Union) in OECD imports of manufactures ~re roughly the same - 1.8 aIXi
1 .6 per cent, resPeCtively. By 1976 the socialist countries bad in-
creased their share to 1.9 per cent (the highest share ever gained by
those countries) , whereas the NICs 1::xx>sted their share to 6.1 per
cent. And by 1982, as the Comecon share of OECD import manufactures
dropped back to the 1970 level, (Le. to 1.5 per cent) the share of
the NICs increased a:Jain to 8.5 per cent!6
Such a shift in trade of manufactures wi. th the OECD countries was
not due to the growing protectionist pressures and trade restrictions
in the OECD countries , which have mainly put up such barriers a-,
gainst agricultural imports. Rather, it was due to the growing level
of export cornpetitiveness of the NICs, which have conducted more
market-oriented p:>licies than the Comecon countries , which still rely
on a system of central planning. And that system has proved . to be
inflexible and unable to change the prevailing, rather hostile atti-
tudes towards export-led growth or trade wi. th Western countries on
the basis of the play of market forces.
The other econornic, or /TOre precisely, financial factor determining
the present developnent of East-West economic relations is the high
level of hard-currency indebtedness of the Comecon countries. These
countries were not able to use the inflow of Western financial resour-
ces (which in the years 1970-82 equalled approximately $ 50 billion)
to develop competitive export sectors in their economies which would
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be able to earn enough hard-currenc:y to finance imports arrl to service
a continuing net inflow of credits from Western sources. According to
various estimates, at the end of 1983 the gross hard rurrrency debts
of the European CMEA countries totalIed S 93 billion (according to the
calculations of the Vienna Institute of Comparative Economic Studies
about S 81 billion). In cornparison to Mexico I s debts (S 85 billion)
and to those of Brazil (S 97 billion), the foreign debts of the
European CMEA merrber countries (including those of the Soviet Union)
were not high '0:1 international standards. "Nevertheless, the 'disrup-
tive potential' which could result from a new balance of payments
crisis in sane East European countries. •• is large enough to threaten
destabiliza tion of the international financial narkets." 7
The Comecon countries have failed, however, to increase their
exports to the West in order to improve their foreign debt position,
which in the first half of the 1980' s reached the level of 50 per cent
of all hard-currency incomes. 8 Instead, they had. to cw:b their imports
severely. The sharpest decrease in their irrports from the West oc-
curred in 1982. Gradual recognition of that fact '0:1 private Western
lenders brought about - apart from financial restrictions based upon
political considerations - a decrease in the flow cf new credits to
the Comecon countries. The net transfer cf resources declined from
1979 on and - coinciding with a sharp rise in interest rates - ha::1
become . negative '0:1 1982 (in the case cf the Soviet Union already in
1980).9 While the demand for new credits and bank services was strong-
est in Poland, Romania and the GDR since the l:eginning oE the 1980' s,
two of these countries - Poland and Romania - ~re considered to be
the most risky by banks presently engaged in financing East-West
trade. 10
However, some kim of "economic turning point" occurred in East-
West relations in 1983 due to the visible improvement of the balance
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of trade of the Comecon countries. The $ 4 billion trade deficit with
the West in 1981 was converted into a surplus of $ 4.5 billion in
1983. This also resulted in a surplus of the hard-currency current
account which has brought about a reduction of debt. Net in:Jebtedness
of the Comecon countries was reduced by more than $ 8 billion in 1983,
almest $ 3.5 billion of which was due, however, to the upward revalua-
tion effect of the dollar. 11 In this situation of improvement in the
relevant balances of trade an:1 services most Comecon countries have
once again found access to the Western capital market (with the excep-
tion of Poland and to some extent Romania). In the last two years
( 1984 and 1985) the majority of Comecon countries lessened their
restrictive iITport quotas and have partially expanded their trade with
the West.
There is, however, another factor which determines and will con-
tinue to determine to some extent expansion of imports of the six CMEA
countries from the West. It is the growin:J dePendency of Eastern
European countries upon Soviet energy deliveries. In the past years,
the majori ty of Eastern European countries had already allocated a
part of their resources (includin:J Western technology and investment
goods, imported very often on credit terms) to exports in payment for
Soviet energy. Many cf these resources are tied up in long-term Soviet
energy projects. The Soviet Union has insisted in recent years that
the Eastern European countries should pay with I hard I instead of the
traditional 11soft" goods for energy. However, IIpayment in I hard I goods
constrains even further the capacity cf the East Europeans to trade
with the West and acquire the sophisticated technologies they need if
they are to JrOdernize their economies and, concomitantly, enhance
their ability to produce the very 'hard' goods of which the USSR is so
desirous. It also prevents the earnin:J of the hard currency necessary
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to pay off enormous debts to Western creditors."12 It is assumed that
if the Soviet Union wants to receive "hard" comnodities for eoorgy
exports to the six-CMEA countries, the latter must expand their econe-
mic (and, inevitably, political) relations with the Western ex>untries
which can provide thern (and, thus, the Soviet Union) with the modern
technology needed, among other things, for the intensification of oil
and gas extraction and transportation. Therefore, 000 can expect in
the near future that the Soviet Union will not oppose the expansion of
the six CMEA countries' trade with the West, even at seme expense of
intra-eMEA trade.
Of course, the Soviet Union cannot require from the Comecon ex>un-
tries the deliveries of high-quality manufactured goods and at the
same time expect that those countries will be able to significantiy
expand exports of those goods to the Western ex>untries. As seme econo-
mists justly point out, "the room for manoeuvre available to the East
European planned economies for expanding their exports to the West and
limiting their hard currency 1:x>rrowing depends to a critical extent
upon the stance adopted by the Soviet Union." 13 It should be added
that without resolving the mentioned dilerrma, Le. without reconciling
the two oontradictory Objectives ex>ncerning the expansion of exports
of "hard" goods from the Comecon ex>untries 1:x>th to the West aal the
Soviet Union, i twill be very hard to intensify East-West trade aal
"economic relations. The question rernains open to what extent the
Soviet Union (as weIl as the other suPerpower - the United States)
will be able to ltOnopolize East-West economic and political relations.
The state, nature and developnent of these relations will also depend
to a great extent on the rate ofeconomic growth and on the progress
of economic reforms in the Comecon ex>untries as weH as on the abili-
ty of those ex>untries to ex>nduct m:>re autonomous policies towards the
Western countries • Western European ex>untries have already gained a
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considerable degree of control over their economic aoo political
relations with socialist countries . Eastern European countries have
been trying to gain a similar "freedom of choice" - at least with
regard to their trade partners. The possible gain of comparable con-
trol over their relations with Western countries will depeoo r.oth on
the a ttitude aoo policy cf the Soviet Union and the United States.
Some authors express the opinion, that "because of the differing
i nterests of their allies , both superpowers will probably tend more
arrl more to monopolize East-West contacts. 1I13a However, there does not
seem to .be in sight such a close cooperation .between the United States
aoo the Soviet Union that could effectively reverse the above-men-
tioned trend and the desire of Eastern European countries for more
control over their relations with the West.
1 .2. The U.S. and Western European trade policy towards
the Comecon countries in the 1980 I s
As already mentioned above, there is hardly a uniform Western
approach to the question of trade with the East. Whereas U.S. "East-
West trade pOlicy" is determined primarily by political factors,
Western European commercial p::>1icy towards the East is based mainlyon
economic factors. This sterns from the fact that the U.S. is a less
trade-dependent econorny and i ts interest in the developnent of econo-
mic relations with the Comecon countries consists mainly in promoting
i ts agricultural exports to the Soviet Union, Polarrl and seme other
Eastern countries. On the other hand, Western Europe is a highly
trade-dependent region and is interested in expanding its traditional
exports of industrial goods to Eastern Europe and in maintainil'lJ i ts
irrports of raw materials and energy. The common feature of economic
arrl trade policies cdopted in Western countries in the 1980 I s has been
the growth of protectionist measures which seriously hiooered the
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developnent cf normal (Le. relatively normal) economic relations not
only with Eastern countries , but also with ether highly developed and
developin; countries . In the period under consideration, the Comecon
countries have, however, been additionally hit by the iX'licy of errbar-
go and various trade and credit restrictions pursued for non-economic
reasons by the United States and seme OECD countries .
There are continuing disputes anong OECD countries over the legiti-
macy of using economic sanctions against the USSR and Comecon coun-
tries in the framework of a "cOllUTK)n Western trade strategy", which in
reali ty does not werk due to the divergent interests of the U.S. and
sane Western European countries. The most important controversial
issues concernin; a common Western approach to the question of trade
with the East have been the followin;: the gas pipeline issue, in its
later phases combined with the extraterritoriality issue; technology
transfer and the question of how Western allies should - according to
American suggestions - restrict trade with the East in so-called
"dual-use" technology; the advisability cf credit subsidies to facili-
tate trade with Comecon countries which are short of hard-eurrency
reserves; aoo the fundamental divergence between Western Europe aoo
America in iX'litical persPeCtive - that is, on the viability cf de-
tente and on an appropriate strategy for East-West economic and polit-
ical relations. Some of these issues and the question of the most-
favored-nation-elause (MFNC) in u.s. trade relations with Comecon
countries will be discussed in the following section.
1 .3. A brief history' of the MFNcl! in U.S. relations
with Comecon countries
Despite all the efforts of Western European countries to conduct a
fully autonomous "East-West trade policy", the U.S. continues to exert
a decisive influence on East-West trade and on foreign trade policies
of Western Europe towards socialist countries. The u.s. has tradition-
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ally regarded trade with the Soviet Union arrl Eastern European coun-
tries as "fundamentally p:>litical" arrl disproportionately beneficial
to the East. Since the end cf the Second World War, the U.S., for
various poli tical reasons, has teen reluctant to normalize i ts trade
relations with Comecon countries on a naminatory basis by granting the
MFNC. For particular Comecon countries , such non-discriminatory treat-
ment has been the sine .9!:§.~ for profitable exports to the United
States. During the Korean War the U.S. Congress passed the "Trade
Agreements Extension Act" (1951), which (in section 5) granted the
President powers that included "suspending , withdrawing or preventing
the use of MFNC as regards the imports from the Soviet Union and the
irrports fram any country daminated by an tmfriendly government or
controlled by foreign, conununist organizations." 15 According to that
act, President Truman susPended the MFNC in U.S. trade relations with
all socialist countries (except Yugoslavia) tetween August 1951 and
June 1952. The MFNC was restored to Poland 00 Noverrber 16, 1960 by
President Eisenhower . 16 This was due to the coincidence of several
events: the signing in JUly 1960 of an agreement regulating the ques-
tion of compensations for Arnerican property nationalized in Polard
after the Second World War (under the agreement, Polarrl obliged her-
self to pay $ 40 million in compensation); Poland' s entry into the
GATr, first as an associated rnerrber, since 1967 as a full-merrber; and
a friendly reception of Vice-President Nixen in Polan::1. The fact is
that even after the passing of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Poland
retained the MFNC until the beginnil):J of the eighties.
The situation of other Comecon countries was less favorable in the
sense that, except for Yugoslavia, they could not regain the MFNC from
the United States, since they were not able to fulfill all the p:>liti-
cal requirements stipulated in the above..mentioned Act and later in
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the famous Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974. In that
new Trade Act the right to grant the concession of MFNC to a non-
market-econcxny country was conditioned on the fulfillment of the
following prerequisites (Section 402):
- it should not deny to its citizens the right or opportunity to
emigrate,
- it should not irnpose higher taxes than nominal on emigration arrl
should not demand other than nominal fees for passport, visa, etc.,
and it should not irnpose more than a nominal tax , levy, fine, fee ,
or other charge on arry citizen as a consequence of the desire to
emigrate.
Section 402 of the Act also states that it is the President of the
United States who determines whether or not a given country violates
these provisions. 17
In the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, the liberalization of the emigra-
tion policies of the socialist countries became a main determinant of
the economic relations of those countries with the U.S.. A "liberal
emigration fOlicy" directly determined not only each Comecon country I s
chance to obtain MFNC treatment, but government-supported credits,
credit and investment guarantees, the conclusion of a trade treaty,
IMF membership, and other more or less visible preferential treatment
as weIl. In other words, the character of those relations has been
determined by an 11 appropriate" , liberal emigration IX>licy (as defined
by the American President), rather than by the prosPect of developing
mutually advantageous trade between the United States and a given
socialist country.
Despite all those conditions for obtaining the MFNC and a very
complicated procedure for the renewal of that trade concession, it can
be stated that the provisions of the above-mentioned Act have made
visible progress towards trade liberalization. In the years 1961-1974
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i t proved absolutely impossible for a socialist country to get the
MFNC treatment frorn the U.S. Some analysts consider the Jackson-Vanik
Amend.rnent as "an effective blockade" of a prosperous developnent of
economic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union aoo
other socialist countries•. Therefore it cannot be denied that one of
the basic aims of that Amendment was "the sabotage of the policy of
detente and trade with the Soviet Union." 18
It should also be noted that Section 402 of the above-rnentioned
Trade Act also envisaged a "softer" (more lenient) procedure of grant-
ing the MFNC to a selected socialist country. Such a poss ibility was
not, however, eIrployed 'in the case of the Soviet Union which consid-
ered the Jackson-Vanik Amendment as the violation of the Trade Treaty
of 1972 arrl thus canceled that treaty at the beginning of 1975. On the
other hand , a more liberal approach has been taken by the United
States in relation to Romania and Hungary, both of which received the
MFNC in 1975 arrl 1978 respectively. The situation of Polaoo was dif-
ferent as compared to the other Comecon countries in that Poland had
previously obtained the MFNC from the United States and therefore did
not have to adjust its emigration policy according to the afore-
mentioned requirements. In the seventies, however, Poland had beeri
conducting the most liberal emigration policy cf all Comecon coun-
tries.
It was only after Decerrber 13, 1981, when "Martial Law" was imposed
in Polarrl that the United States fundamentally changed its attitude
arrl policy towards Polarrl. Beginning on Noveltber 1, 1982, President
Reagan suspended the MFNC (re- )granted to Polarrl more than twenty
years earlier. Officially, this step was taken, because Polarrl had rot
met i ts import obligations to the merrbers of GATI' arrl i ts military
government had increased repression of merrbers of the de-legalized
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trade Union "SolidarnoSc". This suspension was to remain in force as
long as the Polish governrnent does not chan;Je these conditions. 19
The first reason given by the President of the U.S. was purely
economic aoo was in accordance with the provisions of the protocol
regulatin:;J the accession of Poland to the GATI'. Accordin:;J to that
protocol, Poland obliged herself to increase her imports from GA'IT-
member-countries by 7 per cent per annum. This obligation - \rbich was
extended for an unlimited Period of time - was, hO'Wever, not linked
with the rate of growth of exp:>rt-incomes nor with the rate of econo-
mic growth in Poland. Therefore, in the situation of bJth deepening
economic problems in Poland and spreadin:;J economic recession in the
world, Poland was simply not in a p:>sition to fulfill her obligations
concerning the exPansion of inports. The second reason given by Presi-
dent Reagan is a prrely p:>litical one and has been explained in detail
in numerous publications. This was the main reason for imposing the
economic sanctions on Poland to be discussed in the next section.
The first effects of the susPenSion of the MFNC had already become
visible in 1982, although the U.S. President decided on April 14, 1983
that Polish goods sold to American customers could be treated accord-
in:;J to the preferential U.S. tariff of "Column 1" if the sale-con-
tracts were concluded before OCtober 9, 1982, arrl those goods were
delivered to the United States before June 30, 1983. After this dead-
line Polish goods have been charged according to the non-preferential
customs-tariff of "Column 2". The majority of Polish exports to the
United States has usually been shiPPed in the fourth quarter of each
year and the contracts have thus been concludedin Novenber and Decem-
ber. In consequence, Polish exports to the United States fell drasti-
cally from $ 365 million in 1981, to $ 212 million in 1982, aoo to $
189 million in 1983. In 1984 they rose to the level of $ 220 million~
In that year the falling trend in Polish exports was stopPed - in fact
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exports rose 1984 by 16.2% as c:ompared with 1983. 20
However, the so-called clirect effects c:onnected with the suspension
of the MFNC were not se severe, at least at the be;innirg of the
1980 I s, because Polish exports to the United States were equal to only
3% of total Polish exports to capitalist countries. More severe were
the indirect effects such as: losing the status of a friendly country
arrl losing access to credits, credit-guarantees and possibilities of
gaining sane advantages from the General System of Preferences. To
those i nclirect effects must be added the quantity restrictions for
Polish exports (or in other ~rds the import quotas), withdrawal of
sane American firms fram cooperation with Poland, the necessity of
production and export adjustment in order to meet the new requirements
of American customers, the heavy losses of Polish transport and for-
warding enterprises and the general uncertainty regarding the further
development of Polish exports to the American merket.
It must be added that in 1982-83 the United States Congress tried
to withdraw the MFNC from Romania, which cliscriminated against some
groups of Christians and national minorities (Hungarians livirg in the
Western part of that country) and also introduced a very high "emigra-
tion tax". After consultations with representatives of the U.S. Gov-
ernment, Romania canceled the "emigration tax" arrl in Septerrber 1983
received a renewal of the MFNC for the next year. The same situation
occurred in the following year as weIl as at the beginning of 1986.
Despite the efforts of seme merrbers of the U.S. Congress to withdraw
preferential treatment from Romania, which c:ontinues to violate the
provisions of the Jackson-Vanik Amendrnent, the U.S. Government will
once again renew the MFCN for that c:ountry in exchange for the t=ermis-
sion to several merrbers of the Baptist Church and seme clissidents to
leave Romania. 21 After all, by suspending the MFNC for Romania, the
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U.S. would lose much of its leverage on both domestic arrl foreign
policy of this socialist country. At present , the MFNC has been re-
newed only for Yugoslavia an::l Romania. No ether socialist country has
been granted this preferential treatment by the United States. This is
due to the fact that in U.S. Government circles the prevailing view is
that potential U.S. advantages connected with the developnent of trade
and economic cooperation with all socialist countries on the basis of
the MFNC are less than potential U.S. lesses resulting from the growth
of the economic an::l military fOtential these countries ~uld gain from
the improvement of economic relations.
1.4. Controversial issues in U.S. an:i Western European trade
policy towards the Comecon countries
At the beginning of the eighties the U.S. Govemment expressed its
concern about the growing dependence of Western Europe on the supplies
of Soviet gas. It was argued that the construction of the Urengoi
pipeline, which would supply 7 per cent of West European primary
energy consumption by 1990, would make Western Europe highly dependent
on the Soviet Union, which - in turn - ~uld be able to exercise "sub-
tle" poli tical or commercial influence over Western Europe. The United
States maintained that natural gas exports ~uld "significantly in-
crease the Soviet Unions I s hard-currency earnings"; i ts enhanced
ability to finance future arms expenditures would constitute a threat
to the goals and interests of the United States. At the same time,
Washington defended i ts CMn renewed grain trade with the Soviet union
by arguing that it demanded Soviet hard-currency expenditures. 22
Western Europe did not share the arguments of the Reagan Administra-
tion; the contrasting views between the U.S. an:i Western Europe pro-
duced major tensions over East-West e::onomic fOlicy within the Western
alliance.
It must be recalled that even before the negotiations between
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Soviet officials and Western firms on the oonstruction of the Urengoi
pipeline, Le. before 1978, Soviet gas exports to Western Europe, had
rapidly increased from 1.8 billion cubic meters (bnc) in 1970 to the
level of 24.5 bcm in 1980. 23 In 1980 negotiations were ooncluded on
the final contracts for equipnent, gas delivery and financing of the
construction of one gas pipeline in 1981 and 1982. From this point
on, the pipeline has become the most oontroversial issue in the dis-
pute between the United States and its Western EuroPean allies about
the most desirable shape and future of East-West trade {X>licy.
After DecelTber 13, 1981, when martial law was imposed in Poland and
the United States had taken a tougher {X>licy line towards the social-
ist countries of Eastern Europe, that dispute transformed into "the
greatest scandal in quarrels between the U.S. and Western Europe.1I24
From that point in time, the United States decided to take direct
action in order to hinder or even prevent the oonstruction of the
Urengoi pipeline. Almest immediately, Le. at the end of DecelTber
1981, the Reagan Administration imposed unilateral sanctions cn U.S.
oil and gas technology and equipnent l::x:>und for the Soviet Union arrl
earmarked for the controversial pipeline. At the same time, U.S.
officials attempted to persuade the Western European governments' to
join the American action. Due to differi~ views on the use of trade
as an instrument of foreign {X>licy, the Western European response
fell short of the exPeCtations of the Reagan Administration. Thus, in
the spring of 1982 the United States warned that sanctions WJuld be
extended to European finns if Western Europe did not voluntarily
comply with the embargo.
In this way, at the beginning of 1982, the so-called extraterritor-
iality issue reached the newspaper headlines. The Reagan Admininstra-
tion decided to make use of provisions cf the 1979 Export Administra-
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tion Act to inpose a unilateral U.S. elTbargo m the export of equip-
ment, which was then extended to subsidiaries abroad arxi foreign firrns
using U.S. technology arxi equipnent. This evoked deep resentment frorn
Western European governrnents, which decided rot to stop the delivery
of technology and equipnent for the construction of the Urengoi gas
pipeline. Domestically, the piPeline issue evoked a controversy within
the United States between the "security lol:by" supportirq the policy
of errbargo arrl the "business lobby" opposirq it. The representatives
of the latter argued that econornic sanctions ~re cornpletely ineffec-
tive arrl cgreed with the Europeans that the extraterritorial applica-
tion of the 1979 Export Adrninstration Act was illegal.25 The advocates
of the business lobby stressed the fact that nea.sures such as the
pipeline elTbargo should not be applied if the goods involved were
available to the targeted country frorn elsewhere. In additon, because
of the elTbargo Arnerican exporters could lose rnarkets in the East as
well as the West. "The threat to Eastern markets was, however, of only
marginal inportance to the Arnerican exporters of industrial plant and
equipnent. Excludirq agriculture, CMEA markets account for less than 1
per cent of American industrial exports. Cf rnuch greater importance
was the threat to Western rnarkets as Olstomers drew lessons from the
pipeline elTbargo. European industries usirq Arnerican technology or
cornponents responded to the use of extraterritorial controls by ac-
tively seeki~ out non-Arnerican sources of supply. ,,26
As mentioned above, the dispute between the United States and
Western Europe was finally resolved on Noveaber 15, 1982, after one
month of negotiations, by the withdrawal of the embargo arrl an agree-
ment to .tighten .controls of the exports of sensilive high technology
to the Soviet Union and other Comecon countries arrl to hiIlder access
of those countries to new credits by raisirq the interest rateaIld
elirninating various subsidies to trade with the East. The Western
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Europeans also promised not to negotiate further contracts to p.rrchase
natural gas from the Soviet Union until a study by the International
Energy Agency (IEA) on European dependence on Soviet gas had been
canpleted. Thus, the energy issue, which had triggered the dispute,
was isolated from other controversial issues arrl negotiated wi.thin the
confines of an international organization.
Accordirg to seme Western analysts, the U.S.-Western Europe agree-
ment on the necessity cf "makirg economic relations with the East
canpatible with the security interests cf the Western Alliance" is
more than diplomatically covering up a lack of substantive consensus;
rather, i t forms a basis for forgirg consensus on operational steps
like the updating of COCOM-lists, etc. 27
In fact, since the lifting of the U.S. errbargo, the subject of
technology transfer and East-West trade has not been a source of
continuing "oPen" controversies in Western trade ~licy towards the
Comecon countries. But this problem has not disappeared. The U.S. has
been tryirg in various ways to impose on other Western countries their
o\twl1 very restrictive view of East-West trade by extending substantial-
ly the list of controlled comrnodities. The U.S. has been seekirg to do
this through direct pressure on individual countries and through CCCOM
(the Coordinating Corrmittee on Multilateral Export Controls) .
Moreover, there are also deep differences in the decision-making
processes and structural patterns cf institutions and constitutional
regulations for economic relations wi. th the East. As seme American
authors justly remark, "the U.S. decision-makirg process is almost
unique arrong nations in the extent to which•••governmental ~wers are
shared arnong the various units of government ••• To crld to the complex-
i ties , both the President and the Corgress are obliged at times to bow
to the courts as individuals and groups exercise their rights of
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judicial initiative and appeal. With a structure of that sort, policy
initiatives and actions to block policy initiative can oome from a
dozen different quarters. ,,28 There is also a oonstitutional difference
in bureaucratic politics on foreign trade: the United States has
always required licences for all items contained in the Conmodity
Control List (CCL) while a governmental licence of similar nature in
other OECD menber countries is the exception. Such a licenci~ proce-
dure is applied in the United States to all exports defined by the
above-mentioned National Control List (CCL) regardless cf their desti-
nations. In January 1984, the Department of Commerce, under pressure
from the Department of Defense, proposed new rules for the distribu-
tion of licences, a "form of general licence used for multiple exports
between American canpanies and foreign subsidiaries or affiliates. ,,29
This stipulated that Ammerican exporters would henceforth have to
provide more detailed information on the use and location of their
goods once they left the United States. In the sane year two different
bills emerged from the House and senate revisi~ the Export Adminis-
tration Act of 1979. They revealed oontrasting approaches to American
export control policy. The original House bill leaned towards easi~
the difficulties of American exporters in oonducting ~st-West as well
as East-West trade. The bill also attempted to simplify and streamline
the administrative process of export oontrol. The original Senate
bill, in contrast, exhibited a more restrictive approach to export
control which was favored by conservatives and national security
advocates. The Senate bill sought to strenghten bureaucratic mecha-
nisms controlli~ the transfer of goods and technology to the West as
well as the East - in the hope of preventi~ unauthorized diversions
of such i tems by end-users in the United States and other Western
countries. 30 Finally the "compromise" bills emergi~ from the House
and senate in the first days of the 98th Co~ress attempted to recon-
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cile the two approaches both to West-West and East-West trade. Those
bills, however, failed to resolve the fundamental question of where
the focus of decision-maki~ in American exp:>rt control p:>licy should
lie, that is, in the Defense Department or in the Department of Com-
merce. 31
A similar statement can be made concern~ the "unilateralization"
of the export restrictions of Western governments (mainly cf technolo-
gy exp:>rt restrictions). Particular Western govemments may have Olle
or more of the followi~ Objectives in restricting exp:>rts to the USSR
and other socialist countries:
- denyi~ the USSR technology of direct military significance, for
example, systems for guidance and control,
- curbing Soviet acquistion of Western "dual use" (civilian and mili-
tary) technology, for instance in computers, which might have
potential military applications,
- retarding the developnent of branches, like oil and gas, that play a
key role in Soviet economic developnent and exp:>rts, and
- protesting specific Soviet foreign policy actions.
On the other hand, multilateral Western exp:>rt restrictions are
coordinated by the CCXX)M which maintains three lists of ·products and
technologies (recently up:lated and supplemented) whose exp:>rt to the
USSR and other socialist countries is errbargoed, controlled, or moni-
tored through export licenci~ by COCOM merrber governments (all NATO
member-countries except Iceland and SPain plus Japan). There are still
some disagreements among the merrber governments of CCXX>M over which
specific products or technologies should be added to, or removed from,
these three lists. 32 On the one hand, the Western European countries
are willing to, or simply must, cooperate with the United States in
the area of security in order to contain the military threat of the
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Warsaw Pact countries. On the other haOO, Western Europeans rompete
with the United States in the area of col'llTlercial relations in order to
maintain their tramtional links with Eastern Europe and to inc:rease
their share on that market.
As many empirical studies confirm, the export restrictions crlopted
by CCX:OM or by individual Western countries have arrtailed Soviet aoo.
Comecon countries I acquisition of Western technology for important
branches Jf their industries such as electronics, electrical machine-
ry, metalworkil'XJ machinery, oil and gas equipnent and chemical equip-
ment. Many Western analysts admit, however, that it is not fOSsible to
reach a quantitative assessment of the impact of these controls. 33 As
a recent study by the OECD shows, the contribution of Western tech-
nology to the growth and developnent of Soviet industry as a whole
appears to be modest. 34 It should also be added that restrictions aoo.
errbargoes have not retarded the economic developnent aoo. technical
progress in other socialist countries. Those restrictions helped to
promote the economic consolidation of the Comecon countries and their
cooperation in developil'XJ their substantial technological resources.
Because of space lirnitations it is not possible to describe in
detail all controversial issues in Western trade policy towards the
Comecon countries . In the first half of the eighties a growil'XJ tenden-
cy to pursue political goals by various rreans of economic sanctions
and embargoes became visible. First of all, poli ticians in the United
States seem increasingly inclined to use economic sanctions in support
of foreign policy goals. On the other haOO, most of the scholarly
publications do not confirm the view that such tools of economic
coercion produce the desired results. On the contrary, most of the
academic literature supports the conventional wisdom that economic
sanctions aoo. errbargoes are rarely effective and frequently counter-
productive. 35
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The experi~ces of the past few years indicate clearly that the
goals arrl possibilities of a Western fX)licy of economic linkage in
relation to the Comcecon countries are limited. Any attempt to in-
f luence Comecon countries I policy directly by c.penly challenging the
socialist system's continuity, security (through military pressure) or
political sovereignty is doomed to failure. On the other harrl, there
is still room for a Western policy cf "positive linkage" in East-West
economic relations. Much will dePend, however, on overcoming the
controversial problems in Western trade policy towards the Comecon
countries • For the time being there is still In consensus on the
design of a Western East-West fX)licy that could be grounded on the
above-mentioned positive-linkage approach.
2. Fast trends cf the United States/Western European
trade with Comecon countries
Since the Second World War, East-West trade has been relatively
insignificant in comparison with \\Orld trade or with the intra-trade
of OECD countries • There is, however, a growing nu.rrber of p.Jblications
and analyses devoted to the problems of East-West trade. 36 This re-
fleets more the political than the economic significance of East-West
economic relations. The U.S. role in East-West trade has been small
when compared wi th other highly develoPed Western countries , particu-
larly Japan and West Germany. In 1973, for example, the United States
exported to the socialist countries only snall quantities of manufac-
tured goods. It had only 3.5 per cent of the total market shares of
Western manufactured goods exported to the socialist countries , com-
pared with 40.9 per cent for West Germany and 7.5 per cent for Japan.
However, there has been a transition from a passive to a more active
U.S. role in East-West trade, dictated in Part by increased world
business competition. In 1976 total trade turnover between the U.S.
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and Comecon countries (includin;;J the Soviet Union) was $ 4,365 million
in which $ 3,501 million accounted for U.S. exp:>rts to those countries
and only $ 865 million for U.S. imports. In 1984 , the value for U.S.
exports to Comecon countries was $ 4, 179 million and imports - $ 2, 152
million (see Tables 1 and 2, statistical annex). However, in 1984 the
Soviet Union, the six Comecon countries and the People I s Republic of
China accounted for only a small share of total U.S. trade. Exp:>rts of
$ 7.2 billion were only 3 per cent of total U.S. exp:>rts, while
irrports of $ 5. 7 billion made up only 2 per cent of total imports.
Trade with this group, however, provided the U.S. with a surplus of $
1.5 billion. U.S. trade with China reached an all-time high of $ 6.4
billion in 1984. So, if we exclude U.S. trade with China it becomes
evident that trade with Comecon countries is still of small importance
to the United States. U.S. exp:>rts of agricultural products have been
the only exception. 37
Table .!..:.. U.S. Trade with Centrally Planned Economies in Selected Pro-
ducts, 1983 and 1984 (millions of dollars)
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Source: United States Trade Performance in 1984 aIXi OUtlook, U.S.
Dept. of Commerce, Washington, D.C. 1985, p.32.
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Agricultural exports account for the bulk of total U.S. exports to
socialist countries (see Table 1). Sales of U.S. agricultural goods to
Canecon countries will tend to expand in the near future , particularly
given the problems of socialist agriculture. 38 On the ether harrl, the
performance of the United States in the export of manufactured goods
to Comecon (or all socialist a::>untries) lags far behind that of West-
ern Europe and Japan as weIl as behind real American possibilities • In
1976, 73 per cent of all Western exports to socialist a::>untries were
made up of manufactured goods. The United States ranked tenth among
the Western suppliers of such goods behind Belgium and Sweden. This is
weH below its competitive potential, as the U.S. is a major exporter
of manufactured goods to Western a::>untries, in particular high-tech-
nology industrial goods. U.S.-manufacturing exports to the socialist
countries consist primarily of such products as machine tools and
equipnent, pumps and compressors, aircraft and parts, automotive manu-
facturing equipnent, and electrical machinery. The greatest importer
of those goods is the Soviet Union with ene-half cf total purchases of
U.S. manufacturing exports to socialist countries. The next leading
customers are Poland and Romania. However, the total volume of U.S.
exports to Poland is largely a function of Polish grain ·imports. On
the other hand, U.S. imports from socialist countries are a:>mposed of
raw materials and low-technology manufactured goods. Imports cf capi-
tal goods accounted for less than 1 per cent of total U.S. imports
from the Soviet Union in the seventies. Among the products imported
from the Soviet Union, platinum is of increasing importance, because
i t is used in the catalytic a::>nverter required for all U.S. automo-
biles manufactured after 1977. Thus, if we a::>mpare the so-called
indicator of dependence on foreign sources of seme raw-materials like
chromite/ferrochrome and platinum-group metal, the major supplier
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countries of those two raw-rnaterials to the United States are South
Africa (44 an:! 50 per cent of U.S. imports respectively), the Soviet
Union ( 12 an:! 22 per cent), Zimbabwe and Turkey (each 8 per cent for
chromite-ferrochrome) and the United KiIl:Jdom (12 per cent for plati-
num) .39 U.S. imports from Poland and Romania consist mainly of agri-
cultural and manufactured goods. The most important products iroported
from Poland are canned ham and pork which account for 88 per cent of
U•S. agricultural imports from there. Imports of manufactured goods
consist of leather footwear, organic chemicals, iron and steel sheets,
as weIl as iron and steel nails. U.S. imports from Romania are concen-
trated in two areas - mineral fuels and manufactured artic1es. Agri-
cultural inports involve canned ham, pork and cheese.
There is an int:>alance between U.S. exports to and imports from
Comecon countries. In 1976, for example, U.S. exports to the six
Comecon countries amounted to $ 1.2 billion and to the Soviet Union
to $ 2.3 billion, but imports came to only $ 643 and $ 210 million
respectively. In 1984, U.S. exports to the six CMEA countries a-
mounted to $ 0 .9 billion and to the Soviet Union $ 3.3 billion,
whereas imports came to 1.6 billion and $ 0.6 billion respectively
(compare Tables 1 and 2 of the statistical annex). In 1984, only the
six Comecon countries recorded a small surplus in their trade wi.th the
United States, while the trade balance of the Soviet Union was highly
negative. The six Comecon countries and the Soviet Union together ran
negative trade-balances with the United States which amounted to $
2,529 million in 1982, $ 1,533 million in 1983 an:! $ 2,027 million in
1984. This situation occurred despite a visible decrease in the growth
rates of the U.S. exports to Comecon countries (excludiIl;1 the Soviet
Union) and a significant increase in the growth rates of U.S. imports
from Eastern Europe (see Tables 3 and 4, statistical annex). Future
prosPects for increasing trade between the U.S. an:! Comecon countries
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will be bleak if the socialist countries are not allowed to increase
their exports to the United States. A steady expansion of trade be-
tween the United States and the Comecon countries requires more U.S.
absorption of Comecon exports if these countries are to pay for their
irrports. For the time being the share of U.S. exports to the Soviet
Union aoo to Eastern Europe (in 1982 - 1.2% aoo 0.49% of total U.S.
exports respectively) is very small. The same statement applies to
U.S. imports from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe which in 1982
constituted only 0.1 per cent and 0.34 per cent of total U.S. imports.
The share of all Comecon countries (including the USSR) in total
exports of the United States amounted to 1.4 per cent in 1983 aoo to
1 .9 per cent in 1984 as compared to 3.9 per cent in 1975 - the highest
share those countries have so far attained. Thus, the share in 1984
was about 50 per cent below that of 1975. Comecon countries also make
up a very small share of total U.S. imports, 0.5 per cent in 1983 and
0.7 per cent in 1984 as compared to 0.9 per cent in 1979 (see Tables 5
an1 6, statistical annex).
The p::>or developnent of U. S. trade wi th Comecon countries in recent
years has been due to a general deterioration of East-West economic
relations starting in the 1980's. A decline occurred in 1981 and 1982,
followed by stagnation in 1983 aoo 1984 (compare Tables 7 arrl 8,
statistical annex). From 1981 to 1984 the annual rates of growth of
OECD exports to Comecon countries were negative, as were the annual
growth rates of OECD imports from those countries - with the exception
of 1984 (compare Tables 9 ,10 arrl 13, 14; statistical annex).
The visible decrease in the rate of growth of East-West trade in
the first half of the ei.ghties resulted not only from unappropriate
trade policies (described in the previous section of this report), but
also from the growing internal difficulties of the socialist coun-
30
tries, the deepenin;J economic recession in the West, protectionist
pressures , the worsenin;J of poli tical relations between the two super-
powers, and the high foreign indebtedness of the Comecon countries •
This last factor still exerts a decisive influence on the import
policy of Comecon countries, which are tryin;J to euro their imports
with the West and to use export revenues to reduce their indebtedness.
However, economic recovery did take place in the West durin;J 1983,
which also stimulated demarrl, for .- in particular - raw materials,
semi-finished products and fuels from Comecon oountries. The absolute
decline in OECD imports from Eastern Europe (the Soviet Union ex-
cepted) , which started during the fourth quarter of 1980, came to a
standstill during the third quarter of 1983 as a result of rising
demarrl from the West. Since then, in the wake of the economic upswing
in the West, there has been a noticeable acceleration in the demand
for inports from Comecon countries. It should be stressed that East-
West energy trade, in particular net energy exports from Comecon
countries to the European Community, has been expandirg until 1984. In
that year, energy irrports from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
accounted for one-quarter of the Community I s total energy imports from
third countries and covered 11 per cent of the Community I S primazy
energy needs. It can therefore be said that East-West trade begins to
look more significant to the West when certain product groups are
considered - in partieular, energy imports. For example, in 1984 the
Federal Republic of Germany received 24 per cent of its natural gas
supplies from the Soviet Union, compared with 14 per cent from Den-
mark, and 29 per cent from the Netherlands (the balance comirg from
domestic sources) • Since natural gas accounted for 15.6 per cent of
West German energy consumption, Soviet natural gas made up slighty
less than 4 per cent of total national energy consumption. The impor-
tance of Soviet gas supplies to West Germany will increase over the
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next few years urrler existing contracts, but shall remain below 35 per
cent of total natural gas usage, according to an agreement on the
upper limit of dependency on Soviet supplies of arry major fuel for
each NA'IO men'ber (see previous sections).
In general, the flow of trade in energy from Eastern to Western
Europe reached. a record level in 1984 of over 100 Mtoe (or the ~va­
lent of 2 million barrels daily). Oil and oil products, mostly from
the USSR, accounted. for 70 per cent of the total; natural gas for
about one-fifth; and coal from Poland about 10 per cent (see Table 2).
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Table 2: Net energy inports from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

















USSR 56.7 72 54.7 79 67.6 82 73.6 81 82.2 80
Cmde oil and feedstocks
22.8 29
of which
20.8 30 26.7 33 31.55 35 38.0 37
USSR 21.0 27 18.0 26 25.2 31 30.7 34 37.6· 36.8




25.5 37 31.3 38 34.1 38 33.0 32
USSR 15.6 20 16.9 25 24.0 29 24.6 27 23.1 23
Natural gas
USSR 18.5 23 19.4 28 18.1 22 17.6 19 20.6 20
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Coal
10.5 13 3.1 4.5 5.8 7 7.2 8 10.8 10.5
of which
Poland 8.9 11 2.71 4 5.5 7 6.5 7 9.92 10
USSR 1.6 2 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total as % of
Community energy
ilTports (net)
14.9 15.5 19.7 24.0 25.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sources: Statistical Office of the European Comnunities and lEA/OECD arrl
Energy in Europe", Commission of the European Convnunities, Decenber 1985, No.
3, p. 10.
1 Polish strike
2 UK Miners' strike.
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In 1984, the Soviet Union was the largest sin:;Jle supplier of crude
oil arrl oil products to the European Community. However, i ts six per
cent share in oil supplies to the world market does not give the USSR
any special control over the quantities of oil available to Western
Europe or over the terms of oil availability • The same applies to
Soviet supplies of gas, which will probably not give the USSR much
leverage on Western Europe. Some estimates irrlicate that imports of
Soviet gas to the European Community will not rise to more than 30
Mtoe by the end of the 1980 I s . Poland is, in turn, the main supplier
of coal. COal iIrports from Poland have now recovered from the slump
following the Polish miners' strike in 1981. In 1984, Le. at the time
of the British coal miners' strike, Polish coal exports were over
million tons above the 1980 level. There are, however, limited possi-
bilities of further expansion of East-West trade in energy. The future
levels of that trade will dePend to a great extent on the Corrmunity 's
inport demarrl as weIl as on cornpetition from other suppliers. Taking
into account the present situation on the world oil market arrl the
limited production potential of the Soviet Union, i t seems that trade
in oil between Eastern and Western Europe will remain significant over
the coming years, but the anounts involved seem more likely to fall
than rise.
It is interesting to note that the Soviet Union sPent only about
two thirds of i ts Western European trade earnings (Xl imports from
Western European countries • The rest was spent on food imports -
mostly from outside Europe. Foodstuffs, in Particular grain, is anoth-
er cornmodity of special importance in East-West trade. The Soviet
Union and seme other Comecon countries represent more important mar-
kets for American, and recently also Argentinian and Australian feod-
s tuffs exporters, than to Western European Olles.
Another characteristic feature of East-West trade is the relative
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stability of its conunodity structure. In fact there has been hardly
arrt change in the composition of trade over the years. In 1983, the
Comecon countries still exported to the OECD area mainly fuels (60 per
cent of the total value of their exports). In the case of the USSR,
the share of fuels was even higher aOO Irore stable, accounting for 80
per cent of Soviet total exports to the West. On the ether haOO, raw
materials (excludirg fuels) constituted 8 per cent of total Comecon
exports to the West, arrl agricultural products 12 per cent. There was,
however, a visible decrease in exports of manufactured products to
OECD countries - the share of those products in total Comecon exports
to the OECD area amounted to about 28 per cent in 1980, 20.7 per cent
in 1983 an:i about 20 per cent in 1984.
There was also no significant change in the oommodity structure of
Comecon irrports from the West. In the 1980' 5, the largest share of
inports were manufactured goods (53-65 per cent of total imports from
the West), followed by foodstuffs (22 per cent), raw materials (15 per
cent) arrl fuels (only 2 per cent). The majority of Comecon countries
are strongly dependent on trade with Western oountries, which are the
main suppliers of modern techoology, capital and many investment
goods. The share of OECD countries in global imports of Comecon ooun-
tries in 1980-1984 amounted to 27.8 per cent and in global exports a
little less, 27.2 per cent. Durirg the same period, intra-eMEA trade
an:i economic cooperation increased visibly due, among other thirYJs, to
the U.5. policy of economic sanctions aOO trade restrictions against
socialist countries described above. Thus, 000 of the unexpected
effects of that policy was an increase of the six Comecon countries I
dependence on trade with the 50viet Union. The small Comecon a:>untries
reduced their irrports from the West. In 1983, for example, the value
of Romanian imports from the West amounted to 33 per cent of the value
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of its 1980 Western imports. In the case of Poland it was 44 per cent;
for Czechoslovakia - 67 per cent; in Hungary - 79 per cent; 86 per
cent in the case of the GDR; arrl 97 per cent for Bulgaria. Cf course,
the curbing of iJrports from the West was also due to the attempts of
particular Comecon countries to reduce their foreign debts mainly by
decreasing their iJrports from, rather than accelerating their exports
to, the so-called "hard-currency area".
Up to the middle ,cf 1985 the Comecon countries have rot, however ,
adjusted their imports from the OECD area according to the actual
level of economic activity. Some of the Comecon countries had already
accelerated their rate of economic growth and in the last three years
have made positive adjustments in their economic systems. On the other
hand, there is an urgent need for further adjustments which "would be
less burdensome if refinancing of the maturities (of debts of the CMEA
countries) would facilitate an iJrprovement of the maturity distribu-
tion. More lon;;r-term credits would also serve the interest of Western
exporters, because such financin;;r would allow CMEA countries to resume
a faster exPansion of their imports from the West. ,,40 As cne analyst
has justly remarked, "balanced trade by 1990 would appear to be the
most favorable solution both for East and West, allowin;} the Western
industrial countries to increase their exports to the East reasonably
quickly, yet at the same time eliminatin;;r the balance-of-payments
deficits of the CMEA countries in the long rune But this variant
presupposes on the part of the West to grant further credits to the
CMEA countries throughout the 1980 I s, reasonable growth prosPects for
the OECD area, and avoidance of increased protection in the OECD
countries I import policies. ,,41 However, in the present situation,where
credits from the West are not as easily availabe to the Comecon coun-
tries as in the seventies, chances are rather bleak for a visible
expansion of East-West trade through the growth of imports to the CMEA
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countries from the West. The same is true as to the p:>ssible expansion
of the Comecon countries I exports to the West. It is known that an
enormous majority of the CMEA countries has not developed 11export-
industries" producing high-quality goods for exports to the OECD area.
However, in the present situation, those Comcecon countries heavily
indebted to the West must simply fim ways to produce more am in-
crease their exports to the West as weH as to developing or other
Comecon countries on a hard-currency basis. That task will not be
achieved under the present system of planning and the rather incon-
sequential decentralization and reform of the management of the econo-
my.
3. Future Prospects
It is commonly accepted that in order to itensify their imports
from the West the Comecon countries have to look for more durable and
safe forms of trade with Western countries. They have also been look-
il"XJ for new impulses which are hard to find within the framework of
traditonal bilateral forms of trade and economic cooperation. For toth
sides, much is to be gained from the introduction and adoption of
multilateral forms of trade and through the creation of new forms of
economic cooperation between, for example, Western and Eastem Europe.
The Comecon countries must first increase their exports in order to
expand their imports from the West. The most promising p:>ssibility of
increasing the exports from socialist countries to the West lies in
securing those countries the so-called preferential treatment on the
European Community's market. Since 1975 the Community has been con-
ducting an autonomous p:>licy towards the Comecon countries mainly by
introducil"XJ import quotas. There is no trade agreement between the EEC
am CMEA as a whole. This implies that socialist countries are not
entitled to the preferential treatment that the Community offers, for
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Iexample, to many countries.
There are, of course, several alternatives for improving the future
institutional framework of the Community~omeconcountries economic
relations. The maintainance of the existing status quo would not
create the conditions for further expansion of European East-West
trade. One solution would be the conclusion of a non-preferential
trade agreement between the EEC and CMEA. But this solution would
irrply the recognition of the EEC by the individual socialist countries
as well as by the CMEA as a whole. Such a recognition would entail
sane fX>litical costs, although no economic ones. Within sucha non-
preferential trade agreement, the Comecon countries could probably
obtain sane reduction in the quanti tative import quotas mentioned
above or some other trade concessions. These would probably be rather
insignificant and would not bring about a visible improvement in trade
between the two groups of countries •
The chances for a rapid expansion of that trade would be greater if
the Community would be willing to conclude a preferential trade agree-
ment with the CMEA countries. SUch an agreement would stimulate intra-
EuroPean trade and economic cooperation as weIl as desirable struc-
tural adjustments in toth parts of "divided" Europe. The point- is,
however, that if the Comecon countries want to gain nore access to the
Community's market, they must also be ready to open their markets for
the Community 's exports of manufactured goods. If we assume that there
would be a real chance to create some kind of "free trade zone" for
the expansion of trade in manufactured products wi.thin the whole of
Europe - although in reality no such chance exists -, the main problem
would lie in fin:JiIl;1 a solution that would allow for a balanced in-
crease in inports and export as trade is liberalized. As the Comecon
merrbers are not developing countries (although some of them have
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similar characteristics), they cannot expect to derive all the gains
of expanded trade for themselves. Every liberalization of trade bet-
ween the Community and CMEA countries is p:>ssible only cn a mutual
basis.
In the near future, there is, however, only a bleak chance (or 00
chance at all) that both groups of oountries will be willing and ahle
to oonclude seme kind of preferential trade agreement or create a free
trade zone for the exchange of manufactured products. Even if such an
agreement were concluded, it would take at least 10-15 years for the
implementation of the necessary structural and institutional changes
in the Comecon countries and their trade systems. However, the recent
exchange of v iews and formal letters between the EEC and Comecon
countries has made it clear that the Community does not want any far-
reaching relationship with Comecon, though it is open to bilateral
dealings with individual Eastern EuroPean countries. 42 Hence, the
Cemecon countries have recently dropped their insistence on a group-
to-group trade agreement, an idea the Community had always rejected on
the ground that Comecon has no responsibility for the trade policies
of i ts members. At the beginning of 1986, the Community confirmed
that it is giving favored treatment to Romania, Hungary and Czechoslo-
vakia. Romania already has ooncluded an agreement with the EEC (nego-
tiated in 1980), and both HUI'XJary and Czechoslovakia have expressed
interest in similar agreements. Of the two, the Hungarians have been
the more eager, but their enthusiasm has waned with the EEC I s failure
to offer significantly better access to the EEC market for Hungarian
goods. Bulgaria and Poland have so far limited their formal oontacts
with the Community to a reluctant acceptance of quotas for their
exports of steel and textiles to the EEC. The Soviet Union has until
recently tried to pretend that the Corrmunity does not exist, though
this has not prevented this oountry from buying surplus EEC beef and
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Ibutter at bargain prices. And the GDR represents a special case: i t
already has privileged access to the EEC market 'r:1i way of West Ger-
many. The recent change of the Comcecon I s attitude towards the EEC is
- accordin;} to same experts - a sign of the new realistic approach to
the question of trade and economic cooperation with the West. The
Soviet Union and other Comecon countries recognize the fact that the
EEC market takes about two-thirds of Western exports from the European
members of Comecon. 43
One can conclude that at present there i.s no real chance for a
camplete reorientation of the traditional patterns of East-West trade
and economic cooperation. One can exPeCt only a gradual liberalization
of the conditions under which cooperation will remain "in line" with
Western economic and political interests. From the Western European
perspective, a further expansion of East-West economic relations would
depend rrainly on poli tical, rather than economic, forces. From the
Comecon perspective, slow economic growth (as compared with other
countries) and serious foreign indebtedness are seen as the main
driving forces behind national economic reforms as weIl as the search
for closer economic ties with Western countries . 44 Wi thin the system
of interdependence with the United States, Western Europe has· a con-
siderable degree of control over Europe's future. The Eastern European
countries are tryin;} to gain same control over Europe I s future through
the implementation of economic reforms which have far-reaching politi-
cal implications. It seems that the present, ambivalent relationship
between the United States and the Soviet Union creates an opportunity
for the so-called " differential detente" confined to Europe. Much
will depend on the attitudes adopted 'r:1i the Western EuroPean countries
as weIl as on the ways East-West trade will be used as an instrument
for improvin;} all-EuroPean economic and. political cooperation. Some
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IWestern analysts consider East-West trade a political trap rather than
an effective tool of East-West policy. Others, such as J.M. Guillaume,
have remarked "we (Le. Western Europe) do not have the capacity to
shape the history of the Soviet bloc•..but we may help briI'x;} about
small changes and rray, by oor own ambivalence, make the p.:>sition of
Eastern countries. •. more ambivalent and therefore more likely to
change. 1I45 If the Western countries could succeed in convincing the
Soviet Union that closer economic and political cooperation between
Western and Eastern Europe would pose no danger to Soviet interests,
i t could be a first step on the long road towards the "Europeanization
of Europe" , a process which would considerably inprove the general
state of East-West economic relations in a loI'x;} run.
Sane concluding remarks
Past trends and experiences in East-West trade confirm the highly
unpredictable nature of East-West economic relations. They are sensi-
tive to the developnent of several external economic an1 political
factors which are hard to assess and foresee. East-West trade is
defined by seme economists as the "relatively most unstable part of
international trade. ,,46 There are, however, several variables (such
as: hard Olrrency balances from exports, imports, the volume of in-
debtedness and interest payments, the rate of economic growth in J::x:>th
East and West, an1 other variables), which can be precisely measured
an1 whose impact on the future developnent of East-West· economic
relations can be more or less accurately assessed. It is, however, the
political factor that has a decisive influence on East-West economic
relations. It has been proven in the past that the deterioration of
the political climate usually leads to a new arms race, isolationism
within the existing regional groupings and military blocs, an1 to
protectionist measures against Eastern products.
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If we assume that the relations l:etween the two superpowers will
gradually irrprove in the future, we can expect that the United States
will not continue to pressure Western Europe into a policy of trade
restrietions which could jeopardize lorYJ-term East-West economic coop-
eration. The United States and other Western oountries would rather
follow a rrore deliberate and prudent p::>licy towards the Soviet Union
and Comecon countries which would briI'YJ about a further improvernent in
East-West econornic relations. As one American expert has justly re-
marked, "in the past, the clamor for subsidized credits a.rrl massive
trade at all costs, regardless of the sensitive ideologieal, strategie
and humanitarian concerns that plague East-West relations, has l:een as
harmful as America' s discriminatory tariff, credit a.rrl export bar-
riers. ,,47 If the OECD countries were to oonduct a "more liberal" trade
and credit p::>licy in the near future, they would help roth to stabi-
lize (or even decrease) the Comecon oountries' indebtedness a.rrl expand
Cornecon inports from the West. Past experiences oonfirm the fact that
most Comecon countries have cut back irrports trom the West only urrler
severe financial pressure . The recent improvement in their balances of
payments creates better oonditions for a further expansion of East
European trade with the West. According to seme experts "such a lib-
eral credit fX)licy would leave room, by a.rrl large, for equal growth of
East-European exports and imports in trade with the West. ,,48 Various
projections show that a more liberal credit fX)licy would also affect
OECD exports to Eastern Europe favorably. It lTIl1St l:e stressed, that a
"more liberal" Western trade and credit fX)licy can improve the pros-
pects for East-West trade only in the short rune In the long run,
however, the econornic performance of Comecon oountries, increases in
the level of competitiveness of their products, and increases in their
exports to the West will determine the scope and rate of growth of
East-West trade and economic cooperation.
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TABLE5
SHARE OF CMEA IN EXPORTS OF SELECTED OECD COUNTRIES
(IN %)
I 1970 1975 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1981f
-------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I
FINLAND I 15.7 23.9 16. 2 19.8 26. If 28.6 27.8 20.8
AUSTRIA I 12.9 17.0 13.121 12.0 11.1f 11.1 12.0 12.1
FRG *1 I 3.8 7. 2 S. 1 If • 9 1f.3 1f.3 1f.6 If • 1
SWEDEN I 5.0 6.3 1f.3 3.9 3.7 3.0 2.5 2.5
FRANCE I 3.6 1f.9 1f.(Il 1f.0 3.7 2. 9 3.5 3.0
SWITZERLAND I If • 1 5.7 1f.12I 3.6 3.2 3.1 3.0 2.9
ITALV I 5.3 6.2 3.7 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.1f
::JAPAN I 2.3 3.9 3.2 2.8 2.6 3.2 2.1f 1.8 VII-'
USA I .8 2. 6 3. 1 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.1f 1.9
DENNMARK I 3.1f 3.5 2.5 2 • If 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.9
UNITED KINGDOM I 3.2 2.9 2.3 2.3 2.0 1.5 1.6 1.8
BELGIUM/LUXEMBOURG I 1.5 3.121 1.9 2.121 2.0 1.7 2. 1 1.8
NORWAV I 2.5 3.5 1.8 Llf 1.5 1.2 1.2 • 9
NETHERLANDS I 1.8 2.3 1.8 1.9 2.0 1.5 1.7 1.3
CANADA I . 1.8 1.7 2.6 2.5 2.8 2.2 2.1
I
EEC *1 I . . 3.6 3.5 3.2 2.9 3.2 2.9
WESTERN EUROPE *~ I 3.9 5.5 1f.0 1f.0 3.9 3.S 3.7 3.3
-------------------I--------------------~-----------------------------------------------------------
OECD TOTAL *1 I 2.9 If • 6 3.6 3.1f 3.3 3.1 3.1 2.8
====================================================================================================
*1 WITHOUT INTRA-GERMAN TRADE
TABLE 6
SHARE OF CMEA IN IMPORTS OF SELECTED OECD COUNTRIES
(IN %)
I 197111 1975 1979 198111 1981 1982 1983 1981.f
-------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I
FINLAND I 16.1 2111.6 23.1 21.f.5 26.6 27.5 28.1.f 26.1.f
TURKEV I 12.9 5.2 12.1 9.8 8.8 1.f.5 8.1.f 8.2
AUSTRIA I 5' . I.f 30. 2 8.8 9.7 11. 8 11.1 1121.1.f 11. 6
GREECE I 5.2 5.2 6.2 5.8 6.7 5.3 5. 1
ICELAND I 1111.7 12.3 12. 6 11.3 9.3 1121.1 11. 1 1111.8
FRG *1 I 3.7 1.f.3 5.1 I.f. 6 1.f.7 5.1 5. 1 5.1.f \J1NSWEDEN I I.f • 7 6.111 6. 1 1.f.8 1.f.3 5.6 6.6 5.7
FRANCE I 2. I.f 3.1 3.1 3.9 I.f. 1 3.7 3.8 3.7
SWITZERLAND I 2.1 2. 6 3.9 3.9 1.f.12I 1.f.11I 3.1.f 3~1
ITALV I 5.5 5.111 5.0 5.3 5.2 6.111 6.5 7. 2
::JAPAN I 3.1 2. I.f 2.111 1.5 1.6 1.1.f 1.1.f 1.3
USA I
• 6 .8 .9 • 6 • 6 • 5 .5 • 7
SPAIN I 1.1.f 2.8 2. 2 2.2 2.6 2.7 3.111 3.1
PORTUGAL I
·
2.2 3.2 2.1.f 2.8 1.5 1.6 1.3
DENMARK I 3.3 5.1 I.f • 7 5.3 3.7 1.f.3 I.f. 1 I.f. 9
UNITED KINGDOM I I 1.f.12I 2.8 2.8 2.5 1.6 2.121 2.121· 2.2.
BELGIUM/LUXEMBOURG I 1.6 2.121 1.7 2.2 2.3 3.2 3.1 1.f.11I
NORWAV I 2. 2 2. 6 2.9 2.2 2. 6 3.7 3.6 3.6




. 3.8 3.8 3.9 1.f.3 1.f.2 1.f.5
WESTERN EUROPE *1 I 3.7 I.f • 1 I.f. 2 1.f.3 I.f • I.f 1.f.7 . 1.f.8 5.0
-------------------1--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OECD TOTAL *1 I 2.8 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*1 WITHOUT INTRA-GERMAN TRAnE
TABLE 7
OECD TOTAL: TRADE WITH CMEA COUNTRIeS
IN MILL. US $
EXPORTS
I
I BULGARIA CSSR GDR*I HUNGARY POLAND ROMANIA EASTERN USSR Ct1EA
I EUROPE
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1970 I 328 778 425 624 871 699 3725 2586 6311
1971 I 323 910 491 739 1035 761 4260 2582 6842
1972 I 348 993 630 831 1679 990 5471 3912 93B4 V1
1973 754 1112 3207 1351 8268 5789 14057 'viI 491 1353
1974 I 847 1742 999 1789 4586 2054 12017 7524 19541
1975 I 1098 1880 1129 1835 5487 2004 13432 12527 25959
1976 I 942 2083 1306 1822 5528 2016 13697 13745 27442
1977 I 903 2086 1195 2322 5054 2338 13898 13544 27442
1978 I 1109 2337 1491 2994 5614 3028 16574 15601 32115
1979 I 1236 2764 2400 2986 6065 3783 19234 19197 38431
1980 I 1603 2964 2482 3291 6490 3905 20735 21548 42lB3
1981 I 1883 2342 2504 3222 4367 3201 17519 22030 39549
1982 I 1543 2148 1712 2875 3227 1704 13209 22629 35838
1983 I 1562 1943 1971 2587 2891 1302 12256 22578 34834
1984 I 1445 1894 1806 2518 2948 1397 12008 21895 33'103
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*1 WITHOUT INTRA-GERMAN TRADE
TABLE g-
OE C D TOT AL: TRAD E WI TH C 11 E A CO UIn RI ES
IN MILL. US $
!t'iPORTS
I
I BULGARIA CSSR GDRi'/ HUNGARY POLAND ROMArHA EAS TER 1-1 US5R cr1EA
I E.UROPE
----------+-------------------------------------~----------------------------------------------------
1970 I 242 726 410 535 1064 552 3528 2846 6374
1971 I 248 829 426 576 1210 625 3915 3091 70tH
1972 I 270 95Gl 51;: 798 1511 796 4838 3499 8~37
1973 I 368 1278 663 1104 2131 11010 6645 539C 12034 V1
1974 I 415 1536 956 1344 2874 1570 8695 8424 1/119 .J::-
1975 I 398 1638 Hl36 1246 3170 1655 9143 8928 18072
1976 I 489 1699 1078 1441 3607 1976 10290 10871 21160
1977 ! 516 1878 1133 1675 3908 1905 11015 12218 23233
1978 I 581 21 e· 2 1412 19i<)7 4392 2341 12814 13970 H·IB4
1979 I 92C\ 275 " 1637 2543 5115 3253 16227 20042 36268
1980 I 978 3195 2097 2805 5607 3408 18090 24684 42174
1981 I 834 273fl1 2184 2496 3624 3549 15417 24279 39696
1982 I 798 2673 2361 2262 3330 2583 14007 25419 3'1426
1983 I 732 2616 2415 2316 3288 2757 14124 24624 38748
1984 I 738 2712 2334 2532 3966 3693 15975 25602 415/7
--------------------------------------_.._------------.-._------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------_._-
*1 WITHOUT INTRA-GERMAN TRADE
TABLE 9
OECO TOTAL: TRADE WITH CMEA COUNTRIES









1970 I 2lf • 2 24. 4 23.3 45. 4 7.8 9.0 19. 6 13. 7 17. 1
1971 I -1.4 17.0 15. 6 1 B. 4 18. 9 8.8 14. 4 -. 2 8.4
1972 I 7 . 6 9 . 1 :2 8. 2 12. S 6:2 • 2 30.1 28.4 51.5 37. L
1973 I lf1.0 36. 2 19. 7 33.8 91.ß 36.5 51.1 48.0 49.8 V1
1974 72. 7 V1I 28.8 3:2.S 6(iJ. 8 43.0 52.0 45.3 30.0 39.1ll
1975 I 29.5 7 • 9 13. 1 2. 6 19. 6 -2.4 11. 8 66.5 32.8
1976 I -14. 2 10.8 lS. 6 -.7 .8 • 6 2.0 9. 7 5.7
1977 I - 4. 2 .., -8.S 27. 4 -8.6 16.0 1.5 -1. S -.0• L.
1978 I 22. 9 12.0 r.4.& 29. (;) 11. 1 ~ 9. 5 19. 3 11:" '~ 17.L-J • _
1979 I 11. 4 18.3 60.9 -.3 8.C 2lf. 9 16.0 :2 3. 1 19. 4
1980 I 29. 7 7 . 2 3.4 10. 2 7.0 3.2 7.8 12. :2 10.lJ
1981 I 17.5 -21. 0 . 9 - 2. 1 -32.7 -18.0 -15.5 2. 2 -6.5
1982 I -18. 1 -8.3 -31.6 -10.8 -26.1 -46.8 -24.6 2. 7 -9.4
1983 I 1.2 -9.5 15. 1 -10.~ -lIZi.4 -23.6 -7. 2 -. 2 -2.8




*1 WITHOUT INTRA-GE.RMAN TRADE
TADLE 10
OECD TOT~L: TRADE WITH CMEA COUNTRIES
ANNUAL GROWTH RATES IN X
IMPOF.TS
I
I BULGARIA CSSR GDR ..· '" HUt~GAF\ Y P OLAt·lD ROt'iANIA EASTERN USSR Ct~EA
I EUROPE
----------+_~_-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1970 I 21. 6 11.1 3.8 1 S . 7 19.3 22.1 15.6 11. 3 13.6
1971 I 2. 9 14. 2 3. 9 7 . 7 13. 7 13.3 11. 0 8.6 9. 9
1972 I 8.8 14. 7 20.3 38.5 24. 9 27.3 23.6 13.2 19.111 \JI0'\
1973 I 36.2 34.5 29.3 38.3 41. IZJ 38.2 37.3 54. 1 44.4
1974 1 12.8 20. 2 44.3 21. 7 34.8 42. 7 30.9 56.3 42.3
1975 I -4.1 6.6 8.3 -7.3 10.3 5.4 5. 2 6.~ 5.6
1976 I 22.8 3.7 4.0 15. 6 13.8 19.4 12.5 21. 8 17. 1
1977 I 5. 6 10. 6 S. 2 16. 2 8.3 -3.6 7. 0 12.4 9. 8
1978 :r 12. 4 16. 2 24. 6 13.9 12. 4 22.9 16.3 14.3 15.3
1979 I 58.4 26. S 16.c. 33.3 16.5 38.9 26. 6 43.5 35.4
1980 1 6.4 15.8 28. 1 10.3 9 • 6 4.8 11.5 23.2 11. Y
1981 1 -14.7 -14. 6 4 . 1 -11.0 -35.4 4. '1 -14.8 -1. 6 ,-7.2
1982 1 -4.3 -2.1 8. 1 -9.4 -8.1 -27.2 - 9. 1 4.7 -.7
1983 I -8.3 - 2. 1 2.3 2. 4 -1. 3 6. 7 .8 -3.1 -1. 7
1984 1 .8 3.7 -3.4 9.3 20.6 33.9 13. 1 4 :0 7.3
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*1 WITHOUT INTRA-GERMAN TRADE
TABLE 11
OECD-EUROPE: TRAOE WITH CMEA COUNTRIES
IN MILL. US $
EXPORTS
I
I BULGARIA CSSR GOR.; Hur~GAk '{ P OL Ar~O ROI'IANIA EASTERN USSR CMEA
I EUROPE
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1970 I 289 738 378 577 764 603 3349 2029 5378
1971 I 298 850 43lii 696 903 661 3838 1918 5756 V'I
'"1972 I 323 915 542 788 1409 852 4828 2468 7296
1973 I 447 1207 676 Hl50 2588 1150 7120 3573 1111693
1974 I 746 1607 920 1687 3818 1598 10375 5544 15919
1975 I 1010 1754 1052 1715 4457 1612 11600 8310 19910
1976 I 843 1870 1135 1711 4438 1570 11568 8160 19729
1977 I 820 1940 1074 2178 4065 1760 11836 9362 21199
1978 I 994 2175 1238 2827 4385 2389 14007 10047 2411354
1979 I 1125 2393 1734 2822 4692 3042 15808 11936 27744
1980 I 1370 2573 1841 3075 5150 2929 16938 148i!0 31758
1981 I 1502 2088 2039 3026 3256 2458 14370 14143 28512
1982 I 1341 1935 1258 2712 2517 1358 11122 13931 25053
1983 I 1348 1779 1309 2382 2371 993 10181 15759 25940
1984 I 1314 1735 1341 2362 2433 997 10183 1394'5 24128
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*1 WITHOUT INTRA-GERMAN TRADE
TABLE .12
OECD-EUROPE: TRADE WITH CMEA COUNTRIES
IN MILL. US $
IMPORTS
I
I BULGARIA CSSR GDR*I HUNGARY POLAND ROMANIA EASTERN USSR Ct1EA
I EUROPE
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~-----
1970 I 224 651 354 512 911 528 3181 2282 5463
1971 I 233 751 396 552 1053 592 3577 2522 6100 \JI
1972 I 251 864 476 762 1306 739 4398 2791 7189 CXl
1973 I 343 1157 624 1056 1865 999 6042 4070 10112
1974 I 378 1371 881 1216 2467 1339 7652 6622 14274
1975 I 358 1512 985 1182 2798 1453 8288 7472 15760
1976 I 442 1572 1038 1358 3156 1701 9267 9422 1869121
1977 I 477 1737 1086 1591 3453 1605 9949 10502 20451
1978 I 537 2004 1343 1796 3817 1892 11388 11949 23337
1979 I 852 2567 1556 2372 4535 2769 14650 17156 31807
1980 I 925 2999 1992 2650 5045 2989 16601 22303 38904
1981 I 776 2526 2049 2309 3142 2856 13657 21837 35495
1982 I 741 2487 2255 2078 3026 2158 12745 23476 36220
1983 I 676 2447 2313 2101 3002 2075 12615 22782 35397
1984 I 641 2494 2120 2235 3622 2629 13740 23611 37351
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*1 WITHOUT INTRA-GERMAN TRADE
TABLE 13
OECO-EUROPE: TRADE WITH CMEA COUNTRIES
ANNUAL GROWTH RATES IN %
EXPORTS
I
I BULGARIA CSSR GOR*I HUNGARV POLANO ROMANIA EASTERN USSR CMEA
I EUROPE
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1970 I 16.7 24.5 23.7 39.4 3.9 2.9 16.2 7.3 12.7 \Jl
1971 I 3.3 15.2 13.9 20.5 18.2 9. 6 14. 6 -5.5 7.0 \0
1972 I 8.2 7. 6 25.9 13.3 56. 1 29.0 25.8 28.7 26.8
1973 I 38.7 32.0 24.8 33.3 83.7 34.9 47.5 44.8 46.6
1974 I 66.9 33.1 36.1 60.6 47.5 38.9 45.7 55.2 48.9
1975 I 35.4 9. 1 14.4 1.7 16.8 • 9 11. 8 49.9 25. 1
1976 I -16.6 6. 6 7. 9 -.2 -. 4 -2.6 -.3 -1. 8 -.9
1977 I -2.7 3.8 -5.4 27. 2 -8.4 12. 1 2.3 14. 7 7.5
1978 I 21. 3 12. 1 15.3 29.8 7. 9 35.8 18.3 7.3 13.5
1979 I 13.2 10.0 40.1 -.2 7.0 27.3 12.9 18.8 15.3
1980 I 21. 8 7.5 6. 2 9.0 9.8 -3.7 7. 1 24. 2 14.5
1981 I 9. 6 -18.8 10.8 -1. 6 -3'6.8 -16.1 -15.2 -4.6 -10.2
1982 I -10.7 -7.4 -38.3 -10.4 - 2 2. 7 -44.8 -22.6 -1.5 -12.1
1983 I .5 -8.1 4.0 -12.2 -5.8 -26.9 -8.5 13. 1 3.5
1984 I -2.5 -2.4 2.4 -.8 2. 6 • 4 .0 -11. 5 -7.0
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*1 WITHOUT INTRA-GERMAN TRADE
TABLE 14
OECD-EUROPE: TRADE WITH CMEA COUNTRIES
ANNUAL GROWTH RATES IN %
IMPORTS
I
I BULGARIA CSSR GDR*I HUNGARY POLAND ROMANIA EASTERN USSR CMEA
I EUROPE
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1970 I 19.5 10.3 • 2 15.2 23.3 21t.8 16.2 12.3 llt.5
1971 I 3.9 15.3 11. 9 7.8 15.6 12. 1 12.5 10.5 11. 6 (J\"
1972 I 8.0 15.0 20.2 37.9 21t.0 21t.8 22.9 10.7 17.9 0
1973 I 36.3 33.9 31. 3 38.6 1t2.7 35.2 37.1t 1t5.8 1t0.7
1971t I 10.3 18.5 1t1.1 15. 2 32.3 31t.0 26. 6 62.7 1t1.2
1975 I -5.3 10.3 11. 8 -2. 8 13.1t 8.5 8.3 12.8 . 10.1t
1976 I 23.5 1t.0 5 • It 11t. 9 12.8 17. 1 11. 8 26.1 18.6
1977 I 8.0 10.5 It • 6 17. 1 9 • It -5.6 7 • It 11. 5 9 • It
1978 I 12.1t 15. It 23.6 12.9 10.5 17.9 llt.5 13.8 llt • 1
1979 I 58.8 28.1 15.9 32.1 18.8 1t6.1t 28.6 1t3.6 36.3
1980 I 8.5 16.9 28.0 11. 7 11. 3 8.0 13.3 30.0 22.:3
1981 I -16.1 -15.8 2.8 -12.9 -37.7 -1t.1t -17.7 -2.1 -8.8
1982 I -1t.5 -1.6 10.0 -10.0 -3.7 -21t.1t -6.7 7.5 2.0
1983 I -8.7 -1. 6 2. 6 1.1 -.8 -3.8 -1. 0 -3.0 -2.3
1981t I -5.2 1.9 -8.3 6 • It 20.6 26.7 8.9 3. ·6 5.5
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*1 WITHOUT INTRA-GERMAN TRADE
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